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BILL RODERICK, INC., a Utah Corporation.
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INTERVENOR-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an action by the appellants (hereinafter
referred to as plaintiffs). <1 > Said plaintiffs prayed for
a preliminary injunction restraining and preventing the
respondents-defendants, Salt Lake County, its officers
and employees, from issuing any building or other permit which would effect property controlled by an ordinance which became effective on January 11, 1967,
which amended the zoning of 1.22 acres of property
located at the southeast corner of 2300 East and 4500
South, Salt Lake County, Utah, from Residential R-3
to Commercial C-1.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was decided by the trial court pursuant
to a hearing on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction. The court after hearing testimony and taking evidence introduced and after submission of memorandum by counsel and argument had thereon and the
court having made and entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, concluded that all the provisions and procedures required by Title 17-27-17, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and Title 8-1-9
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, were
duly and properly complied' with in the amending of
( 1) Plaintiffs in their brief allege that this action was on be~~l.f
of themselves and on behalf of other property owner~ simi·
larly situated. Intervenor and Resp_ondent would llke. to
larify that this is no way a cla~s act~on, ~nd ~hat a review
of the Complaint and the pleadings filed m. this matter, (R.
1) will indicate this is in no way a class action.
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said zoning ordinance to re-zone said premises from
Residential R-3 to Commercial C-1, and that the temporary restraining Order then in effect should be vacated and the plaintiffs' Complaint dismissed together
with defendant and intervenor being awarded their
costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The intervenor-respondent seeks affirmance of the
trial court judgment based on the record made before
the trial court and evidence contained therein as submitted to and heard by the trial court judge.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Bill Roderick, Inc., is the purchaser, of that certain
tract of real estate located on the southeast corner of
23rd East and 4500 South, within the Holladay planning district and is an intervenor-respondent in this
appeal. On or about the 3rd day of November, 1966,
the intervenor made application to amend the zoning
map of Salt Lake County by reclassifying said property from Residential R-3 to Commercial C-1. (Def. Ex.
D-20) This application was submitted to the Holladay
Planning District for its recommendation. The written
recommendation was submitted subsequently to the
Salt Lake County Commission recommending approval, but conditioned that it conform to the Salt Lake
County master plan. (Pl. Ex. P-1)

3

Salt Lake Planning Commission acted upon this
zoning ordinance and recommended disapproval of the
application. (Def. Ex. D-23) At the hearing by the
Planning Commission, two L.D.S. bishops within the
Holladay Planning District were in attendance and
made inquiry as to procedures to be followed thereafter.
(R. 144-146) Said representatives thereupon advised
the people in the area that the application had been
denied by the Salt Lake County Planning Commission
and that approval of said application was unlikely. (R.
146) Thereupon, the application was forwarded to Salt
Lake County Commission for its action, including the
recommendations made by the District Planning Board
and the Salt Lake County Planning Commission. A
public hearing on this application was scheduled to be
held on the 28th day of December, 1966, along with
various other applications for changes of zoning. Notice
of said hearing was accomplished by posting a notice of
a change of zoning hearing on one public utility pole
near the intersection of 23rd East and 4500 South, in
front of the subject property. Another notice of the
proposed zoning change was posted on a utility pole in
front of the property owned by a Mr. Hendricksen,
but near the subject property. (Def. Ex. D-56, R. 219·
220) A third notice of zoning was posted on a bulletin
board on the west entrance of the City and County
Building in Salt Lake City. (Def. Ex. D-55). A no·
tice of said hearing of zoning change applications was
published along with other applications in the Salt Lake
Tribune on or about the 26th day of November, 1966.

(PL Ex. P-7)
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A hearing in due course was held on the application and information was submitted to the commission
presenting facts justifying the change of zoning. Additional facts were submitted by other people in attendance at said hearing. (Def. Ex. D-35)
Said change of zoning was adopted unanimously
after taking the matter under advisement. (Def. Ex.
D-37) Thereupon, the new ordinance was submitted
to the county commission pursuant to its action for signature. (Def. Ex. D-39) Prior to the signature, sometime after the enactment of the ordinance, plaintiffs
and appellants petitioned the county commission to
rescind its action, (PL Ex. P-48), and a meeting without notice to applicant was held and the ordinance subsequently signed. This action to invalidate said ordinance resulted thereby.
INTERVENOR-RESPONDENT'S POSITION
The trial court's decision should be affirmed for
the following reasons:
I. That all provisions and procedures required by

Title 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended , and Title 8-1-9 of the "Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake County" were duly and properly complied with in the amending of said zoning ordinance
to re-zone said premises from Residential R-3 to Commercial C-1.
2. That the amended zoning ordinance is valid.
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3. That the county commissioners did not act in
an arbitrary, and capricious manner and that they properly refused to rehear said matter pursuant to the petition of the appellants. That further, appellants' petition
for re-hearing was not based on any statutory procedures or by any authority of law.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SALT LAKE COUNTY PURSUANT TO
STATUTORY AUTHORITY HAS THE POWER TO AMEND ZONING ORDINANCES.
The legislature has delegated the power to zone
to Salt Lake County so that the need for a protective
plan might be met and has provided means for the pro·
tection of private property through notice and public
hearings. U.C.A. (1953), 17-27-1.
In pursuing its authority to zone a county, a
county commission shall perform a legislative function
and has wide discretion. The action of the zoning authority is endowed with a strong presumption of validity and the courts will not interfere with a commission's
action unless it clearly appears to be beyond its powers
or is unconstitutional. Gayland vs. Salt Lake County,
11 U. 2d 307, 358 P. 2d 633.
A presumption of validity and reasonableness attends zoning ordinances and amendments thereto. In

6

8 McQuillin, l\!Iunicipal Corporations, 3d Ed. 559, Sec.

25.295, it is further said:

"The presumption of the reasonableness validity and constitutionality of ordinances a~plies
fully to zoning ordinances and amendments of
zoning ordinances. Every intendment in favor
of their validity is to be indulged. This is particularly true since zoning is governmental and legislative in character, and constitutes an exercise
of the police power to promote the publtc welfare.
It is presumed that the zoning power has been
exercised reasonably by the zoning ordinance and
that the ordinance is for purposes and within the
scope of the police power. That is to say, it is
presumed that such an ordinance is designed to
promote the public welfare. The court will presume that in enacting a zoning ordinance the
(city council) acted with full knowledge of relevant conditions and circumstances ... "
POINT II
SALT LAKE COUNTY GAVE ADE QUATE NOTICE OF THE HEARING TO BE
HELD DECEMBER 28, 1966, AS REQUIRED
BY LAW.
Section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, provides:
"Before finally adopting any such amendment, the board of county commissioners s?all
hold a public hear~ng thereon, at leas~ thirty
days' notice of the time and pl.ace. of ':"Inch shall
be given by at least one publication m a news-
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pap~r of.general circu~ation in the county and by
pos~mg m th~ee public places designed to give

notice thereof to the persons effected." (Emphasis added)
Provisions in statutes requiring notice preparatory
to the enactment or amendment of zoning measures
typically provide for constructive rather than actual
notice as the publication in a local newspaper for a
specified number of times. Ordinances based pursuant
to them have been attacked as invalid in that without
actual notice the owner has been deprived of his property without due process of law. The courts have rather
uniformly held that this contention is groundless and
that the statute need not provide for nor the ordinances
be passed upon actual notice. See Wanamaker vs. City
Council of El Monte (1962) 200 Cal. App. 2d 453, 19
Cal. Rptr. 554. <2 >
Where the notice of a proposed rezoning hearing
is given, by a publication in a newspaper in accordance
with the State Statute, the fact that a property owner
effected by he rezoning did not read the particular newspaper in which the notice was published, does not invalidate the notice. Braden vs. Much (1949) 403 Ill.
507, 87 N.E. 2d 620. (Emphasis added)
The adequacy of particular newspaper publications of the notice required by various zoning statutes
) In this case the court reviewed the property owner's conten·
<2 tion that the city council could not proper:ly ado~t a ~e~
zoning ordinance without personally se:i:-vmg n?tlce o f
hearing on the proposed ordinance or mak~ng service the~e~e
by mail. The property own~r .was an air operator w ? g
activities would be impermissible under the new zorun
ordinance.
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have been questioned in a number of instances. In absence of the particular stiatutory requ;irements, the
publications need not be given any special notoriety by
reason either of the size of print, location in newspapers
or number of publications. A single publication of notice prior to a hearing to amend a zoning ordinance was
held sufficient compliance with the statutory provisions
requiring at least fifteen days' notice in Central Realty
Corp. vs. Allison ( 1951) 218 SC 435, 63 S.E. 2d 153.
"The tests which will generally determine the
questions of whether the notices were posted in
public places within the meaning of the statute is
whether the posting of the notices in the particular places fulfilled the purpose giving the publicity contemplated by the nature of the notice
required." Wann vs. Re-organized School Dist.
No. 6 of St. Francois County, 293 S. W. 2d 408,
413.
The United States Supreme Court in Mullane vs.
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 206
70 S. Ct. 652. ( 1950) acknowledged that the requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to appraise interested parties and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.
Section 17-27-17, of the Utah Code provides that
notice be given by posting in three public places designed to give notice thereof to the persons effcted.
The following discussion illustrates that the Salt Lake
County Commission did observe the statutory mandate
and its notice requirements.
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(a) The County Did Use Adequate Modes or
Manner of Giving Notice in Public Places as Required
by Law.
Salt Lake County pursuant to the above mentioned
statute posted notice in the Salt Lake Tribune on
or about November 26, 1966. Notices were also published in three public places located in Salt Lake
County. Mr. Preston E. Evans, employed by the Department of Zoning Administration of Salt Lake
County, testified, and in his testimony identified (Def.
Ex. D-55) , which was a notice of a zoning hearing and
testified that he posted a notice of hearing on the south
bulletin board of the west entrance of the City and
County Building on November 23, 1966. (R. 214-215)
Mr. Clair J. Hardman, also employed by the Department of Zoning Administration of Salt Lake
County, testified that he posted two notices of a zoning
hearing in this matter on two utility poles which were
located in Holladay, Utah. <3 > Mr. Hardman was
shown and he identified (Def. Ex. D-56) which indicated the location of two of the notices that were posted
4
for the public hearing in this matter. (R. 219-220) < >
(3) One of the utility poles is located about ten to eighteen feet
from the intersection at 4500 South 2300 East, Holladay, Utah
on the east side of the road adjacent to the property in que~·
tion (R. 219-220). The other utility pole is located approx1·
mately 190 feet south of the farther north po~e and is located
adjacent to the property of Mr. H. R. Hendricksen; and that
the pole adjacent to Mr. Hendricksen's property is about 85
feet south from the corner of his property. (R. 136, 220)
(4) Also see the testimony of Mr. Marvin W. Walbin (pla!nt!ffffs:
witness) found on page 174 of the Record and plamb s
Exhibit number 54.
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In Graham vs. Fitz (1876) 53 Mis~. 307, the court
was concerned with the notice requirements pursuant
to a sale of property pursuant to a trustee's sale. The
court said on page 314:
"It was not the duty of the Trustee to make
daily and hourly observations of the three public
places of the notices, so as to insure their remaining posted. It is not true that the displacement
of the posted notices by casualty or design would
invalidate a sale under them after they had been
duly posted. . . . The trustee under this deed of
trust, may lawfully sell on the day designated
without regard to the fact of wind or rain or some
mischievous or evil dispossessed person may have
removed one or all of the notices. Any other rule
would invalidate such sales. It would place in
the power of the mischievous or evilminded persons to defeat every proposed sale under such
deeds of trust. Any such rule is impractical,
impolitic, and titles would be so insecure under
it as to forbid competition at such sales and lead
to the sacrifice of property."

( 1) Postings Were Made at Public Places as Required by Law.

The courts have held that the posting of notices
upon utility poles or fence posts located at the intersection of roads or on road boundaries as being sufficient and that these notices are as likely to be seen as
at any other place in the territory. The postings by
Salt Lake County were at three public places as required by law. State em rel. Grant School Dist. vs.
School Board of Jefferson Joint School Dist. (1958)
4 Wis. 2d 499, 91 N.W. 2d 219.

11

"Pub~ic plac~s as applied to the requirements
of postmg notices at public places are those
places, that af!ord the most publicity without
regm:a to the title owner of the property." (Emphasis added) See Whittingham vs. Hopkins

54 A. 250, 69 N.J.L. 189.

'

Where a tree, post or similar object used for posting a notice is in a place exposed to traffic and the public view, posting thereon has been approved as compliance with public "place requirements." 90 A.L.R.
2d 1224.
Courts have also rejected the contention that because the telephone poles were private proprty and subject to removal by the owner at any time they could not
constitute public places. The court held that if a notice
is posted in a public place where the attention of the
public is likely to be attracted, the purpose of the law
is satisfied regardless of who may own the property on
which the notice is displayed. <5 > Mahon vs. Buechel
Sewer Constr. Dist. No. 1 (1962, Ky.) 355 S.W. 2d
683. (Emphasis added)
Government buildings, such as courthouses, town
halls, and post offices have frequently been held suffi.
ciently public that a notice prominently posted on or
(5) It would seem by this writer's opinion, that the place~ that
would gain the most notoriety and would affor~ notice to
those persons interested in the zoning proceedings them:
selves would be in the vicinity of the property to be effected,
and as cited supra, two of the pub~i<: I?laces namely the t~o
utility poles were located in the v1cm1ty of the property I~
question. See also Schroeder vs. New York, 371 U.S. 20
(1962), 83 S. Ct. 279.
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in such a building, satisfies the statutory requiremt:ri..~.
(~mphasis added) See 90 A.L.R. 2d 1218.
( 2)

l?' os tmgs Were .l.Hade at Three Public 1'laces.

'fhe county posted three notices at three pubnc
piaces, to-wit: The south bulletin board on the wesc
entrance of the City and County Courthouse buil<lmg,
the utility pole located at the intersection of 23rd ~ast
aml 4500 South adjacent to the property in question awl
ihe utility pole approximately 210 feet south of tlle
mtersection at 4500 South and 23rd East adjacent to
the property owned by Mr. H. R. Hendricksen.

In Graham vs. Fitz (1876) 53 :Miss. 307, the court
held that the requirement of notices to be posted in
three public places was also complied with where one of
the notices was posted on the inside of the post office
door which was closed every Sunday after 10 :00 a.m.
and another notice was posted on the Courthouse door
in the same town. The Courthouse and the post office
being within 150 yards of each other. The court stated,
"that if 150 yards is to be shown a distance to separate
two public places, what space shall be adopted as great
enough. The law has no rule on the subject."
Also in McFarlane et al. vs. Witney (1940) 134
S.,V. 2d 1047, the court upheld posting on a Courthouse and on a service station which was 400 feet from
the Courthouse; and the court stated in this case that
the property where the notices were posted were in no
way connected through ownership.
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The plaintiffs in the above entitled matter are
questioning whether or not the notices posted by Sali
Lake County provided plaintiffs with proper notice of
the zoning proceedings. It seems minute to questiod
lhe distance involved between the posting of the notices.
In this writers' opinion what could afford more notoriety than notices posted on or near the vicinity of the
property in question. The Supreme Court of Utah has
stated in the case of In Re. Phillips, Estate 86 U. 358,
44 P. 2d 699, 703 (1935).

"An affirmative rule of what is sufficient depends so much upon the situation in every county,
and perhaps the situation of the cases themselves,
that hard and fast rules cannot be enunciated."

Caldwell vs. Moffat (1919) 215 Ill. App. 583, held
that although the statute provided for posting of notices
in three of the most public places in town or district in
the vicinity of the road to be widened, altered, vacated
or laid out; even if the posting was not in strictly one
of the most public places in town, the failure to conform
to a strict construction of the law in respect to this one
particular notice was but a mere irregularity and did
not destroy the jurisdiction of the highway commis·
sioners. <6 > (Emphasis added)
( 3) The Places of Posting were Designed to Give
Notice Thereof to the Persons Affected as Required

by Law.
(6) The Notice requirement pursuant to the Utah C?de Annotat~~
(1953) 17-27-17, does not contain the language m.three oft
most public places, but states only in three public places.
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The persons or person charged with posting notices in public places must necessarily exercise and are
entitled to exercise at their discretion in the selection of
locations of the posts where these postings are in public
places and further, no one may complain that in his
judgment the notices should have been placed in other
public places. <7 > And it is not important that a notice
cannot be read by travelers while riding down the highway in their automobiles and that no such requirement
is contemplated by the statute itself. It is further not
necessarily determinative of the question on the posting
that all of the notices can be read by one standing on the
highway or road. Wann vs. Re-organized School Dist.
(1956, Mo.) 293, S.W. 2d 408. (Emphasis added)
(b) The Legal Description Used by the County
in the Notice of the Zoning Hearing was Adequate.
The boundaries of the legal description of the
property in question must only be described with reasonable certainty and with a definiteness sufficient for
identification. (Speroni vs. Board of Appeals of City
of Sterling, 368 Ill. 568, 15 N.E. 2d 302.) Zoning ordi(7) Again this writer would like to stress that the places that
would gain the most notoriety and ~ould affor9- notice to
those persons interested in the zomng proceedmgs themselves would be in the vicinity of the property to be effected;
and as cited supra, two of the pub~ic; I?laces namely the t"'.o
utility poles were located in the vicmity of the property m
question. See also Schroeder vs. New York, 371 U.S. 208
(1962), 83 S. Ct. 279. The courth<?use wh~ch was .select.ed as
the third public place seems a logical choice and is d~signed
to give notice thereof to the persons effected as reqmred by
law. Within the courthouse building an individual will find
the recorded's office, the courts themselves, the .S~lt Li;ike
County treasurer and assessor's offic~ and. the she~iff.s _offic~.
All of these places would bear a relationship to an mdividual s
property.
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nances have been upheld, even though there have been
minor inadequacies in the description of the boundaries.
39 A.L.R. 2d P. 766.
Section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated, provides:
"That 30 days' notice of the time and place of which
shall be given by at least one publication in a newspaper
of general circulation in the county ... " That on or
about November 26, 1966, Salt Lake County caused
to have published in the Salt Lake Tribune notice of
the zoning hearing of the subject property. Plaintiffs
in this action have made argument in their brief that
the description in the notice published by Salt Lake
County was inadequate. Zoning ordinances have been
upheld in several cases, even though there have been
minor inadequacies in the description of the boundaries.
(See Ciaffone, et al. vs. Community Shopping Corporation, et al. 77 S.E. 2d 817. Speroni vs. Board of Appecils of City of Sterling. (1938) 368 Ill. 568, 15 N.E.
2d 302. The courts in these cases illustrated in their
reasoning that the requirement in the legal descriptions
pursuant to public notice is a test of whether or not
the description is reasonably certain and with a definiteness sufficient for identification.
Mr. Ralph Y. McClure, the zoning administrator
for Salt Lake County, and having been employed by
Salt Lake County about fifteen years testified that it
was possible to locate the property pursuant to the description used by the County, and he further testified
that the property was described as reasonbly as the de·
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scription used on tax notices. In fact, he was asked the
following question: "Does it describe the property as
reasonable as the actual tax description?" Answer:
"Well, it is my opinion it's easier to decipher our description than the tax notice's." (R. 208, 209)
He further testified that the descriptions are not
the same a.s the tax notice descriptions for the fact that
most of the legal descriptions the county receives are
several descriptions and that the Salt Lake County Zoning Administration combines the descriptions into one
and describes just the subject property. (R. 209)
The court~ have held on many occasions that the
subject property need not be described perfectly, so long
as the recipients of the notice can reasonably ascertain
from the description that the property in which they
are interested may be effected by the enactment. In
one case, an ordinance was held valid despite the fact
that the description of property effected by it was cliff erent from the property described in the notice pursuant to which it was passed. See Bregar vs. Britton
(1954, Fla.) 75 So. 2d 753, cert. den. 348 U.S. 972, 99
L. ed. 757, 75 S. Ct. 534. (By implication) The court
in this case pointed out that it appeared that the property effected by the ordinance was included in the
property described in the Notice.
The plaintiffs, in their brief at page 20, make mention of the effectiveness of newspaper publications and
cite a comment by Justice Black in the case of Walker
vs. Hutchinson 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956). That case

17

dealt with a condemnation of an individual's own property in a proceeding instituted by a City against a
land owner and that notice of the proceeding to determine the land owner's compensation was given only by
publication in the official City newspaper as authorized
by statutes then in force. The facts in the Walker Case
are far different than the situation in this matter and
the comments by Justice Black would in no way be valid
law as to the fact situation in the present case. It can
well be understood why in a condemnation proceeding
against a land owner he was denied due process of law
by publication only in a newspaper. The plaintiffs and
appellants in this action in no way have a proprietary
or possessory interest in the subject property in the
above entitled matter located on the southeast corner
of 2300 East and 4500 South, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and they would not be subject to the same
rules and principles of law as commented on by Justice
Black in the Walker case, as cited supra.
( c) The County Caused Writings and Posted
Notices to be Exposed to View of the Public for the
Required Period of Time.
It is well established that notice was published in
the Salt Lake Tribune on or about November 26, 1966.
It has further been established that Mr. Evans posted
one notice at the south bulletin board on the west entrance of the city and county building. (R. 215) It is
further established and uncontradicted, that Mr. Hard·
man posted two notices on utility poles located at two
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public places in Salt Lake County, Holladay, Utah.
(R. 218-219)
Plaintiffs' own witness, Mr. Marvin W. Wallen,
identified plaintiff's Exhibit Number 54 and testified
as to remnants of red markings peculiar to zoning notices posted on the above mentioned utility poles. ( R.
17 4-17 5) Further Bill Roderick, Inc., intervenor, produced a witness, Mr. Dennis Leon Ekins, who was an
uninterested party in this action, (R. 107) who stated
that he traveled along 23rd East and 4500 South, Holladay, Utah, daily during the period of November, 1966
through Christmas, 1966. (R. 105) He further testified that just before Christmas, 1966, that he and a
friend were traveling along 23rd East just south of
4500 South, the vicinity of the subject property, and
that his friend brought his attention to a notice of zoning change. (R. 105) He was asked the following
question by Mr. Everett E. Dahl: "You were able to
see the zoning signs from your automobile?" Answer:
"Uh huh" (affirmative R. 106). He further stated,
"We could see them real good." (Emphasis added R.
106)

He was shown plaintiff's Exhibit Number 2, (the
type of zoning notice used by Salt Lake County and
containing the red markings) and he stated that he
remembered the red letters on the notice that he had
seen. (R. 106) Mr. Ekins was further asked by the
court if he looked at the pole and the witness testified
that he did look at the pole. (R. no) Mr. Ekins fur-
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d1er testified that on another occasion he had an opportumty to look at the notices of zoning changes a Iew
year_s ago in Ogden. ( R. 112)
rrnlllt1H produced several witnesses all of witoiu
testu1ed tnat they had not seen tne notices tnaL wert
posteu oy ::,ale Lake County rn the viciruty of tile suuJect property. ;:jome of these witnesses also testmeu
tnat tlley did not l)ee the notice in the newspaper e1t11er.
H would appear that plaintiff's method of showmg tilat
tt1e notices were not posted through negative testllllony
of witnesses is weightless as against positive witnesses
oi the defendant and intervenor and does not prove lliar
the notices were not posted on the poles any more thau
the notice was not published in the newspaper.
Plaintiffs raise the argument that Salt Lake
County in no way introduced any evidence as to the
policing of these notices by the County during this 30
day period prior to the hearing itself. It appears as a
matter of fact that three notices were posted in public
places at least 30 days prior to the hearing and that a
notice was published in the Salt Lake Tribune prior to
this time also. Mr. Ekins, as mentioned above, testified
as to the time when he saw the notices that were posted
on the utility poles indicating that the notices had been
in the Holladay area near the subject property for the
prescribed period of time. A reading of Section 17-27·
17, Utah Code Annotated, in no way sets forth the re·
quirement of policing the notices posted by Salt Lake
County. This would raise an interesting problem in that
20

a property owner in the area that was adverse to fo-.:
iomng change could tear down the posted notices and
tneretore defeat the posting period by his act. .lius
mterpretation would seem to be unreasonable and unpractical. It appears that
a reasonable and valid conr
struction of the statute would be one that the statute
requires notice of at least 30 days in advance prior to
the hearing. This requirement it would appear contemplated a period of 30 days for interested parties and
parties to be effected by the zoning ordinances or zoning
amendment to be placed on notice of such hearing at
least 30 days in advance to allow them enough time for
their preparation to appear at the hearing and to be
heard. This interpretation seems reasonable in that the
statute only requires one notice to be published in the
newspaper and does not require the publishing of notices in the newspaper for each day during a thirty day
period prior to the hearing. It has heretofore been
argued that policing of these notices is not a requirement of law. This writer will not labor this point and
again cites its authority, Graham vs. Fitz (1876) 53
Miss. 307.

POINT III
THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY SALT LAKE
COUNTY IN THIS CASE MEET THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT AND THE PROCEDURE AND ACTION PURSUANT THERETO AND AFFORDS EFFECTED PROPERTY
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0 W N E R S T HE IR CONSTITUTIONAL
lt1GH'1' TU DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
The writer is aware that the United States .Supreme Court has decided questions on this pomt as to
the due process of law issue. One of these decisions,
Mullane vs. Central Hanover National Bank, 339 U.::i.
300 (1950) which was also cited in plaintiff's brief, seis
forth the requirement of due process of law as bemg
one that affords to persons effected, notice reasonably
calculated under all the circumstances to appraise those
parties of the pending action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. This case involved
notice by publication to the beneficiaries of a common
trust fund and the court did consider the problem of
sufficiency of notice under the due process clause. It
should be pointed out that in this case they overruled
petitioner's objections to the violation of denial of due
process as to the published notice to those persons who
were unknown to the trustee. However, the court in
the Mullane case, as cited supra, states at page 59, "We
recognize the practical difficulties and costs that would
be attendant on frequent investigations of the status of
great numbers of 'beneficiaries' many of whose interest
in the common fund are so remote as to be ephemeral;
and we have no doubt that such impractical and extended services are not required in the name of due
process." (Emphasis added) . The court, in this case,
further acknowledged that the Supreme Court of the
United States had not hesitated to approve the resort-
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ing to publication as a cu_stomary substitute in another
class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or practical to give more adequate warnings, i.e., where people
are missing or wnknown. (Emphasis added) The requirement of notice of a public hearing preparatory to
the enactment of zoning measures has typically provided a constructive rather than actual notice, i.e., publication in a newspaper. These statutes and ordinances
passed pursuant to them have on several occasions been
attacked as invalid and that without actual notice, the
owner has been deprived of hi.s property without due
process of law. (Emphasis added) The courts have
uniformly held that this contention is without merit and
that the statute need not provide, nor the ordinance be
passed upon, actual rwtice. <s> Plaintiffs' brief cites
Schroeder vs. New York, 371 U.S. 208 {1962), 83 S.
Ct. 279. This again is a condemnation proceeding and
it is acknowledged by intervenor that some twenty-two
notices were posted on trees and poles in the general
vicinity of plaintiffs' property. However, the court in
that case was not impressed by the many places that
notices were posted, but stated at Page 282, "No such
sign was placed anywhere on the appellant's property."
The point to be made of this case is that this was a condemnation of an individual's own property and not a
case of general notice to many unknown individuals.
It should be further mentioned that the general
rule is that personal notice to property owners effected
(8) See 96 A. L. R. 2d P. 459. Several jurisdictions and court
cases are cited therein.
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by a zoning regulation or amendment is not a prerequi.
site t~ the valid e~actment t~ereof; however, the zoning
enablmg statute itself sometimes requires public notice
for a specified length of time and the holding of a public
hearing by the zoning commission. 58 Am. J ur. P. 944,
Sec. 10. Zoning.
In summary the essence of the issue of whether or
not the requirement of due process of law has been
met is not the criterion of the possibility of conceiv·
able injury, but the reasonable character of the re·
quirements having reference to the subject which
the statute pertains. Mullane vs. Central Hanover
National Bank, 339 U.S. 306 ( 1950). As noted
above in this brief, we are concerned here with an exer·
cise of a legislative power delegated to the Salt Lake
County Commission and it should be noted that there
is a fundamental distinction, as regards due process of
law, between a legislative hearing and an adversary
proceeding. It is not necessary under the requirement
of due process of law that interested parties be present
at all stages of the legislative deliberations. This re·
quirement is properly applicable only in adversary pro·
ceedings. See Hart vs. Bayless Investment and Tral
ing Company (1959) 346 P. 2d 1101. A point that
should be remembered in this case is that the plaintiffi
in this action are residents of the Holladay area, a few
of them are neighbors or living adjacent to the subject
property in this action. None of the plaintiffs have a
direct or proprietary legal interest in the subject pro·
perty. Their only complaint is that of being affect~
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as residents of the area and subjected in this manner to
a zoning change of the subject property. The court in
Benner vs. 1lribbitt, 190 Md. 6, 57 A2d 346 353 stated
'
'
'
"~xercise of the police power in zoning regulations
cannot be governed by a plebiscite of neighbors or for
their benefit."
POINT IV

DEFENDANTS DID OBSERVE STATUT 0 RY AND PROCEDURAL REQUIRBMENTS.
Plaintiffs in their brief under point IV, make
lengthy argument as to whether or not certain procedures were followed by defendant and whether or not
Bill Roderick, Inc., was a proper applicant. This issue
is improperly before the court on appeal and should be
summarily dismissed on the basis that nowhere in plaintiffs' complaint, (R. 1), is this issue raised and further
nowhere in the Trial Record was this issue heard or
determined by the lower court; however, it should be
pointed out that Mr. William C. Roderick, President
of Bill Roderick, Inc., did appear before the court on
the 4th day of May, 1967, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. and
in his testimony (R. 250), he testified that he began
negotiating and had made payment during the month
of August, 1966, pursuant to the purchase of the property in question located at 2300 East 4500 South, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah; and that the actual closing was consummated on November 23, 1966, when at
that time a Uniform Real Estate Contract was entered
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into by respondent and intervenor. He further testified
that he had also entered into an Earnest Money Agreement prior to the execution of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract (IL 251). It should be clearly pointed out
that this hearing on the 4th day of May was for the
purpose of determining a bond that would be required
to be posted by the plaintiffs in order to restrain the
defendants from further action in this matter while
the above entitled action was on appeal to the Supreme
Court of Utah. The low~r court did issue an order and
finding that the plaintiff would be required to file with
the clerk of the court a security in the amount of
$6,500.00, for payment of such costs and damages as
may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found
to have been wrongfully restrained. This was signed
by the lower court on the 18th day of May, 1967. (R.
38, 39) It should further be pointed out that the Order
Vacating the Temporary Injunction and the Dismissal
of plaintiffs' Complaint was signed on the 17th day of
April, 1967, (R. 31) and the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law were also entered by the court on
said date. (R. 33, 34, 35, 36, and 37) Nowhere in said
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law appears tl1e
issue as argued by the plaintiffs in this matter.
Plaintiff further complains that the ordinance is
invalid on the basis that certain office procedures within
the planning commission were not followed in that .the
list of the property owners within 150 feet of the sub.Jee!
property were not furnished and that no statements

26

were furnished from the property owners in the vicinity
expressing their position on the propo_sed change oi
zomng. Nowhere in the State Statutes, nor in the
County Ordinances themselves, is any such requirement
set forth and the procedures complained of is mere
information that the planning staff likes to have in
arriving at their recommendations. Failure to comply
with these requirements is not jurisdictional nor mandatory in the zoning procedures, and are mere irregularities and fly specks which frequently occur in
legislative positions. Caldwell vs. Moffatt, 215 Ill. App.
583, (1919).

POINT V
DEFENDANT COMMISSIONERS' AC TIONS WERE REASONABLE AND SAID
ACTIONS WERE NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS.
It should be pointed out that in pursuing its authority to zone a county, a county commission shall
perform a legislative function and has wide diescretion.
The action of the zoning authority is endowed with a
strong presumption of validity and the courts will not
interfere with a commission's action unless it clearly
appears to be beyond its powers or is constitutional.
Gayland vs. Salt Lake Comity, 11 U. 2d 307, 358 P. 2d
633. Also a presumption of validity and reasonableness
attends zoning ordinances and amendments thereto. 8
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed. 559, Sec.
25.295.
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Even though it may be true that there was informa.
tion presented to the commission for denial of the
amending of the zoning ordinances or as advocated by
the plaintiffs in this matter, it is also true that information was presented by Bill Roderick, Inc., the intervenor and respondent, in favor of the change of zoning.
The evidence in the possession of the planning commission and before the county commission, was not introduced into evidence and the matter of reasonableness
of the determination by the County Commissioners was
not an issue during the trial. ( R. 213) It is not the
prerogative of the court to substitute its judgment for
that of the county commission. Parkinson vs. Watson,
4 Utah 2d 191, 291P.2d400, and Gayland vs. Salt Lake
County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633.
(a) In Refusing to Permit Certain Proper~'
Owners a Rehearing on the Zoning Ordinance Which
Had Been Enacted In This Matter, the Defendant
Commissioners Acted in a Reasonable Manner and Did
Not Act Arbitrarily or Capriciously.
This court has previously held that it would not
intervene in the wisdom of the subject legislative action.
Gaylen vs. Salt Lake County, supra. It should be fur·
ther pointed out again that there was not sufficie~t
evidence to even raise the issue of arbitrary and capr1•
· · m
· t he 1ower court·
ciousness of the county comm1ss10n
( R. 213) The plaintiffs did raise an issue of arbitrary
and capricious action in the commission's failure to re·
scind its action taken on January 11, 1967, (Def. Ex.
D-39) pursuant to a petition presented to the defend·
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ant commissioners on January IO, 1967, (Pl. Ex. P-48),
which was nothing more than an abortive and ex-party
proceeding instituted by the plaintiffs. The procedure
taken is not provided for by statute and again only
goes to the merits of the wisdom of the legislative action
taken by the commission. The mere fact that many
names were procured on a petion objecting to the action
of the commission is no evidence of the wisdom of the
legislative action taken. It effects only legislative expediency which may be considered by the commission.
Plaintiffs further contend that the planning commission acted in recommending a denial of the zoning
change prior to its receipt from the Holladay District
Planning Commission. It should be noted that the
recommendations of the Holladay Planning Commission were merely advisory and its recommendation did
not have any particular bearing upon the planning commission's action because the planning commission recommended denial of the zoning change whereas the
Holladay District Planning Commission had recommended favorable action. Both the report of the Holladay District Planning Commission and the report of
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission were submitted to the Salt Lake County Commission, who
eventually made the final decision concerning the
zoning.
There is very little evidence in the record concerning the facts dealing with the property in question, and
the facts either justifying the zoning or not justifying
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the zoning of the subject property, except that plaintif!i
and persons signing the petition were opposed to it. h
order for a court of law to substitute its judgment for
the county commission, the evidence must be clear and
convincing that the commission acted arbitrarily an<l
capriciously. The plaintiffs conceded during the trial
on a direct query from the trial judge that there was
no issue to arbitrarines.s and capriciousness as to the
action taken by the county commission. Plaintiffs' only
claim to arbitrariness and capriciousness was their
assertion that the county commission did not reconsider
and call an additional public hearing on the matter.
The petition was filed with the county commission setting forth plaintiffs' objections to the zoning prior to
the final action by the county commission in enacting
the recommendations of the planning commission,
which already were before the commission. (R. 213)
(b) The Re-Zoning of the Subject Property was
Reasonable and Constitutional.
The subject property is located at the intersection
of 2300 East and 4500 South, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and is bounded on three sides by public streeh.
On page 42 of the Master Plan for Salt Lake County.
(Def. Ex. D-42), is the provision for the interstate sys·
tern and access roads in the Big Cottonwood District
and specifies that:
"Circulation within the District will be provided in the future by the planned system .o!
expressways and major arterials which will ID·
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elude: 700 East Street; the Cottonwood Expressway; 2300 Ewst Street; and 4500 South
Stre~t; all to be improved to provide adequate
traffic capacity." (.1£imphasis added)
.l.h1s property, as indicated by the Salt Lake County
.t'lannmg Staff itself, acknowledges that the existmg
tl-8 zomng was not the proper zoning for this property
but had questions as to the wisdom of whether additionai
commercial sites were neces_sary. (Def. Ex. D-25)
This property for years had remained vacant and as
pointed out by Mary .Metcalf at the public hearing on
December 28, 1966, (Def. Ex. D-34), wherein she
stated that she knew the area well and that the young
teenage element used the property for a lover's nest,
and that the young people shoot at pheasants and quail
on the property and that she would like to _see the property developed and the vacant property lighted up.
Mary Metcalf is a resident residing at 4567 South 2300
East. Other evidence was also before the commission
showing the planned development of the area and the
advantages of said zoning. The evidence concerning
the facts surrounding the zoning is not included in the
record on appeal for the simple reason that there is no
genuine issue as to whether or not the zoning was reasonable or proper. As to the Master Plan, it was envisioned that zoning changes within the county would
within necessity have to be made. Zoning must be alive,
viable and must meet changing conditions, highway
traffic and channalization of traffic to freeway and
expressway entrances and exits. Certain established
1
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commercial areas may die on the vine because of cliang
mg conditions of population or traffic and other ne 11
areas need to be established to ~atisfy the changin~
situations. All of this action is the prerogative 01 th,
elected political officials charged with this respom1•
bility, to-wit: the county commissioners. The Supreme
Court has consistently ruled that the courts will not su~
stitute its judgment for the governmental bodies
charged with the enactment of constitutional legisla.
lation. This writer feels quite sure that the plaintiffs
do not wish to challenge per se the constitutionality of
the right of the county commission to act in the area o[
zoning property. If zoning is an unconstitutional func·
tion of the county, none of the zoning ordinances are
valid and this would defeat plaintiff's purpose.
( c) The Re-Zoning of the Subject Property b
Grounded Upon Reason and Based On the Policy of
the Statute.
Plaintiffs contend under this section of their briei
that the zoning change constituted spot zoning, and tl1a!
commissioner Blomquist was prohibited by law from
signing the zoning ordinance. As frequently mentioneo
in other parts of intervenor's brief, there are not suffi.
cient facts in this record on appeal for the courts to
attempt to substitute its judgment for the county c~JD·
mission. The burden of proof rests on those challengm~
the validity of the ordinance and as stated in 8 McQ11u·
Zin, Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed. 559, Sec. 25.29~
page 562:
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"T~e rule that the burden of proof is on one

invalidity or unof an ordinance is applicable
with respect to zoning ordinances and amendments ~hereto. Leastwise, where a zoning ordinance is not invalid on its face the burden of
alleging and proving facts to su'pport the claim
of its. invalidity is on the pa:i;ty asserting it. ***
Consistently, there is no burden on a municipal
corporation to show facts establishing the validity
of zoning."
asser~mg.

the

~nreasonableness,

c~nshtutionahty

"The burden of proof on one asserting the
invalidity of a zoning ordinance extends to the
issue of whether or not the ordinance will promote the public safety, health, morals, order,
welfare, prosperity or convenience, and it extends to the issue whether or not the classification
made by the ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary
or discriminatory.***"
The trial of this case was conducted primarily on
the issue of the notice given by the Salt Lake County
Commission for a public hearing on December 28, 1966.
The problem of spot zoning was given very little attention and primarily nothing more than lip service. It
should be pointed out that the district re-zoned is relatively a large tract, exceeding one acre, completely surrounded by three public highways, two of which are
heavily traveled streets and projected to become major
arterial highways. There is a condominum, Carriage
Lane, almost across the street and the old establishe.d
business district a very short distance from the property
and a public school planned for construction within a
very short distance to the East of the property. The
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long vacantness of this property demonstrates its lack
of utility under itiS present zoning, as well as the staff
analysis of the county planning commission indicated
that the property is improperly zoned. (Def. Ex. D-25)
The Supreme Court of Oregon in 1954 in Shaffner vs.
City of Salem, 268 P.2d 599, had occasion to decide a
similar case of spot zoning concerning a service station. This court cited McMullin on municipal corporations as cited above.
Plaintiffs have also attempted to make certain unjustifiable and improper inferences as to Mr. Roderick,
President of Bill Roderick, Inc., and Commissioner
Blomquist on the basis that Mr. Roderick in his testi:
mony concerning the setting of a bond pending appeal,
wherein Mr. Roderick said that he knew Commissioner
Blomquist businesswise. (R. 254) These illusions in
the brief serve no useful purpose on the appeal of the
issues in this case, except in an attempt, perhaps, to
create an atmosphere that the zoning change was ac·
complished by unsavory and unbusinesslike methods
and that the obtaining of the zoning was improperly
done. Mr. Roderick has been an oil distributor for many
years, a director of the American National Bank, Presi·
dent of Bill Roderick, Inc., and has held many positions
in the community. He is highly respected, well-known
and is personally acquainted with many people in and
out of political, business and judicial life. It should
also be pointed out specifically, that the zoning ordinance
was acted upon by a commission composed of Com·
missioners, Larson, Jenson, Creer, and aliSo acted upon
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by Commissioner Blomquist and Hanson. It is regret-

able that arguments outside of the record must be made
in this respect, but it is felt necessary in order to protect
the good reputations of Bill Roderick and Commissioner
Blomquist.
As a closing point in regards to this unpleasant
argument, respondent-intervenor would like to point
out that the Linden Methodist Episcopal Church vs.
Linden, cited on page 54 of plaintiffs' brief, is not in
point. In that particular case, the applicant for change
of zoning was actually a member of the zoning committee, and the change of zoning that said applicant
requested was passed on by the other councilmen on this
committee, solely on the basis that he had served faithfully to the city for six years and deserved something.
Further, in that case there was no evidence or testimony
presented to said council. This is far removed from the
situation in the present case.

CONCLUSION
Intervenor-Respondent considers the sub-titles of
(d) and ( e) of point V, in plaintiffs' brief, to be in the
nature of argument and conclusion and included in the
other issues discussed herein. As indicated within this
brief, ordinances passed on the legislative body carries
with it a very strong presumption of validity. All
doubts as to validity of an ordinance must be resolved
in favor of validity and in the case of a doubtful case
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the presumption of validity must prevail. The intervenor
here has had no part in the legislative proceedings except
for its application for the zoning change, by submission
of plats, sketches and its appearance at hearings in
order to present proper reasons requiring change in the
zoning ordinance. Intervenor has a valuable property
right directly involved in this proceeding and its direct
proprietary interest should not be taken lightly and
destroyed by minute irregularities that are common in
all legislative procedures. The burden of showing that
this ordinance is invalid is very heavy upon plaintiffs
and their evidence must be so convincing and over·
whelming as to remove any doubtfulness as to the validity of the ordinance. This procedure also effects not
only this zoning ordinance, but perhaps some twelve
hundred other zoning ordinances passed since the adop·
tion of the basic statutory laws pertaining to zoning.
The upsetting of this particular zoning ordinance would
place in doubt all other zoning ordinances passed by the
Salt Lake County Commission.
This writer believes that when the two bishops
attended the hearing by the planning commission and
were advised that they had recommended disapproval,
they in turn advised the interested parties that they
probably had little or no worry and as a result they did
not exercise prudent watchfulness thereafter. The issues
raised by the plaintiffs have been separately answered
in this brief. It is this writer's belief that some of the
issues are not properly before the court on appeal. The
trial judge, was very patient in allowing plaintiffs full
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opportunity to present its case and had benefit
of receiving both oral and written arguments. It is
rather basic on appeal that whenever there is a conflict
of evidence on a particular issue the respondent is entitled to have the issue reviewed in a light most favorable
to that finding. The decision of the lower court should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Everett E. Dahl
Leon J. Zanoni
760 East Center Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorneys for IntervenorRespondent
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